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5ECENT DECISIONS
5.-) The employer is liable for the negligence of the physician under
the doctrine of respondeat superior."
Although on the surface the preceding five views seem to be vastly
divergent, they have a common denominator, in that they attempt to place
the responsibility of the negligent act upon the employer only where the
physician is acting as a subordinate. The court in the instant case wisely
chose to establish the defendant's liability upon the superior-subordinate
relationship which existed.
WMNwORTH J. MARSHALL, JR.
LABOR LAW-JURISDICTION OVER INTERSTATE
UNION PICKETING
Defendant was the certified NLRB bargaining union for machinists
employed by plaintiff, an interstate brewery. Plaintiff refused to recog-
nize it as the exdusive representative of the machinists because a second
union which represented other employees would not bargain unless it could
represent the machinists as well. Defendant went on strike and picketed
plaintiff.
Plaintiff charged before the NLRB that defendant's strike constituted a
particular unfair labor practice prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act' The
company also sought an injunction in the state court of Missouri on the
grounds that the union was 1) committing several Taft-Hartley unfair
labor practices2 and 2) violating state policy against conspiracies in re-
straint of trade. The state court sustained this latter ground and granted the
injunction. Thereafter the NLRB dismissed plaintiff's complain; holding
that defendant's conduct did not amount to the assigned unfair labor prac-
tice. The state injunction was then affirmed by the Missouri Supreme
Courta
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court unanimously dissolved
the injunction.4 This exercise of jurisdiction by the Missouri courts en-
croached upon the NLRB's supreme and exclusive jurisdiction as estab-
lished by Congress.
Congress may dearly occupy a field within its power to regulate, so that
state regulation, within the field, is necessarily excluded.5 State regulation
may likewise be wholly precluded when Congress regulates a part of a
field and manifests an intention thereby that unregulated areas of the field
are to remain free from inteference.6 Exclusion of state regulation en-
tirely from interstate labor relations is impracticable because of the es-
'Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947). Phillips v. St. Louis
and S.F. Ry., 211 Mo. 419, 111 S.W. 109 (1908); Tompkins v. Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 53 W.Va. 479, 44 S.E. 439 (1903).
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sentially local as well as national problems involved:7 The Court, therefore,
has cautiously considered state jurisdiction to have been displaced by the
LMRA only to the extent that state remedies have been replaced by those
of, the NLR.8
Defining the boundaries of the Board's jurisdiction - and thus fixing
the permissible area of state regulation- has presented a difficult prob-
lem to the Court because of the dual nature of the Board's power. Con-
gress not only empowered this agency to enjoin certain enumerated unfair
labor practices,9 but also to protect certain undefined union "concerted
activities."'10 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in writing for the Court in the instant
case, recognizes the complexity of the problem -and its solution. The
boundary is "not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and bounds."
Rather, it must be set case by case. The present decision is a milestone in
this survey.
The present interpretation of the Board's jurisdiction is that actions
based on conduct which might reasonably constitute either an unfair labor
practice remediable by the NLRB or a union concerted activity within the
protection of the Board, or both, are within the supreme and exclusive
jurisdiction of that agency. Actions dearly outside this jurisdiction, such
as suits for damages rising out of an unfair labor practice," are properly
within the state's power to adjudicate. But apparently the Court will not
anticipate whether the Board has jurisdiction to grant relief in doubtful
cases, as it did in holding that intermittent work stoppages could not be
'Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (D), 61 Stat. 140, 29 USC 5 158
(b) (4) (D) (1947). This provision makes it unlawful for a labor organization
to strike for the purpose of forcing an employer to assign work to employees who
are members of the organization.
'Id. § 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) and § 303 (a) (1), (2) and (4). These sections
forbid union coercion upon the employer to recognize an uncertified union as his
employees' bargaining agent and secondary boycotts. It is significant that defend-
ant's conduct does not necessarily constitute either of these unfair labor pracitces.
'Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Weber, 265 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1954).
'- U.S , 75 Sup. Ct. 480 (1955).
5 New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546 (1917).
'Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1820).
" See Archibald Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REV.
1297 (1954).
'United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656,.74
Sup. Ct. 833 (1954); International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 Sup. Ct. 516 (1949); Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 69 Sup. Ct. 584 (1949).
'Taft-Hartley Act § 8, 61 Stat. 640, 29 USC § 158 (1947).
1°Id. at § 7.
"United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656,
74 Sup. Ct. 833 (1954).
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either an unfair labor practice or a protected concerted activity in the
Briggs-Straton case.12 The case is discussed, however, without criticism. 3
The present interpretation clarifies the Courtes position in Garner v.
Teamsters, etc. Union.4 that Congress has occupied the field of interstate
labor relations so that state regulation within the field is necessarily ex-
cluded.15 The incompleteness of this rule was pointed up in other portions
of the opinion recognizing that the state police power is a complement to
federal regulation, rather than an obstruction, when local interest are dom-
inant, as in cases of massed or violent picketing.16 Further, the rationale
of the Garner decision is confusingly narrow to sustain such a rule:
This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the NLRB is without
express power to prevent and which therefore either is "governable by the
state or it is entirely ungoverned."' 7
Nor can this rationale be reconciled with the Board's duty to protect certain
undefined union concerted activities.
The present rule resolves these ambiguities. A complainant must first
take his case to the NLRB if it might come within the purview of the
Taft-Hartley Act An exception is made in cases of local emergency which
only local procedures can effectively remedy1 8 But federal jurisdiction
cannot be precluded in doubtful cases by either a state court's finding that
it is not involved, nor a state court's granting of relief based on state laws
or policy independent of labor relations.
This rule is sound adjective law.19 It provides certainty of the proper
"International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69
Sup. Ct. 516 (1949); Supra note 8.
- U.S. at -, 75 Sup. Cr. at 485.
"346 U.S. 485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953).
"The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of picket-
ing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free from other methods and
sources of restraint. For the policy of the national LMRA is not to condemn all
picketing, but only that ascertained by its prescribed process to fall within its pro-
hibitions. Ohterwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by
freedom of labor to use the weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the
area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal
policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which
the Federal Act prohibits." id. at 499.
"Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62
Sup. Ct. 820 (1942).
" 346 U.S. at 488. The basic ambiguity in the Garner case is that the disposition is
grounded on the interpretation that state courts have jurisdiction to remedy in-
jurious conduct only if the Board has no such jurisdiction, while the dictum is to the
effect that states have been completely deprived of jurisdiction over interstate labor
relations. See note 15, supra.
'Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62
Sup. Ct. 820 (1942); supra, note 16.
"United States v. United Mineworkers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct. 677
(1947).
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